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Appeal from an Order of Dismissal of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dismissing the Complaint
of Plaintiff with prejudice.
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge.
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ETHEL SAWYERS ASHWORTH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 920399

JOHN W. BETTERIDGE and
GEORGE G. BETTERIDGE,
Defendants and Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 42, Utah R. App. P.
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUES
1.

Whether

Plaintiff

should

be

required

to

repay

$5,170.51 with interest to Defendants1 insurance carrier, Allstate
Insurance Company, as a condition of being able to assert her tort
claim against Defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.
with

Plaintiff appeals the order dismissing her Complaint

prejudice which dismissal

M

is

appropriate

only where it

clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of
facts they could prove to support their claim.

Colman v. Utah

State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).

In determining

whether the trial court properly granted the motion, we must accept
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff.

St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hospital, 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (May 6, 1991)."

Prows

v. State of Utah, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought a tort action for personal injury
against defendants. (R.2,3) Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment based on accord and satisfaction (R.8-17) which ultimately
resulted in an order requiring Plaintiff to repay money advanced
by defendants' insurance carrier as a condition of maintaining her
tort action.

(R.78-80) Plaintiff was financially unable to do so

and her complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
appeal followed.

(R.84,85)

This

(R.90)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 25, 1988, Plaintiff was lawfully parked in her
motor vehicle in front of Hillcrest High School when Defendant John
W. Betteridge, age 16, drove out of a fenced area of the school,
made an improper right turn and crashed his jeep into Plaintiff's
parked motor vehicle.
Defendant

(R. 68/ 69)

George

G.

Betteridge

was

the

father of

Defendant John W. Betteridge and signed his application for a
driving license and is jointly and severally liable with Defendant
John W. Betteridge for the injuries and damages sustained by
Plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115. (R. 2) Defendant
George G. Betteridge was the owner of a motor vehicle which he gave
2

and furnished to Defendant John W. Betteridge knowing that the said
Defendant John W. Betteridge would operate said motor vehicle on
the

highways

of

the

State

of

Utah

and

Defendant

George

G.

Betteridge is jointly and severally liable with Defendant John W.
Betteridge for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 41-2-116.

(R. 2, 3)

Plaintiff saw several health care professionals from the
date of the accident to January 5, 1990 and incurred $3,262.39 for
medical expenses.

(R. 19, 46)

Defendants' own doctor, Nathaniel

Nord, M.D., found a causal connection between Plaintiff's injuries
and the automobile accident out of which this action arises as a
result of the negligence of Defendants.

(R. 50-55, 54, 64)

Defendants were insured by Allstate Insurance Company
and

an

Allstate

adjuster,

Andra

Hogan,

and

discussions about a settlement in the case.

Plaintiff

had

(R. 18, 19, 21-23)

Defendants' adjuster contends an agreement was reached to settle
the case for $4,500.00 plus additional medical expense of $670.51
or a total of $5,170.51.

(R. 18, 19)

Plaintiff was given a draft

for the said sum and cashed the same.

(R. 19)

Defendants'

adjuster gave Plaintiff a blank Allstate Insurance Company "Release
of All Claims"
release.

(R. 24) and told her to sign and return the

(R. 18, 19)
Plaintiff contends she did not enter into a settlement

agreement because she was still having problems with her cervical
area, left shoulder and right hand and that Defendants' adjuster
to her that if the $5,170.51 was a satisfactory settlement then she
3

was to sign and return the "Release of All Claims."

(R. 21-24)

Plaintiff made five or six visits to a health care professional
thereafter,

(R. 22)

On October 16, 1990, Dan Filler, Unit Claim Manager of
Allstate, wrote a letter to Plaintiff which stated as follows:
Dear Ms. Sawyers,
Per our discussion of today, October 15, 1990,
Allstate has not received the Release of All
Claims which was sent to you with our check in
the amount of $5,170.51 on January 5th, 1990.
As our settlement check has been cashed,
failure to hear from you will result in the
assumption you are in agreement with the terms
of the settlement and have accepted our payment
as full and final settlement of your claim.
Sincerely,

Dan Filler
Unit Claim Manager
(R. 25)
Plaintiff then retained counsel and filed suit against
Defendants.

(R. 23)

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported
by a memorandum against Plaintiff on the grounds that there was an
accord and satisfaction.

(R. 8-17)

A hearing was held on Defendants1 Motion and the trial
court

ordered

two

trials,

one

on

the

issue

of

accord

and

satisfaction and if Plaintiff were successful, then a second trial
on the tort action.

In connection with this, Plaintiff was ordered

to repay the $5,170.51 with interest to Allstate Insurance Company
4

as a condition of being able to proceed with these two trials. (R.
39, 40)

This Order was dated April 15, 1991.

(R. 39, 40)

Plaintiff then filed a Motion for New Trial (R. 41, 42)
which, in fact, was a Motion for "Reconsideration" filed pursuant
to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in accordance with State
Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and
Memoranda was submitted to the court (R. 43-69) and the matter was
argued resulting in the "Order Denying Motion for New Trial and
Clarification of Order of April 15, 1991."

(R. 78-80)

This Order eliminated the trial concerning whether there
was an accord and satisfaction, apparently ruling as a matter of
law that there was no accord and satisfaction, but in order to set
aside the "purported settlement" Plaintiff must pay $5,170.51 with
interest to Allstate Insurance Company in order to proceed with her
tort action against the Defendants.

(R. 78-80)

Plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that she had not
settled her case with Defendants or Allstate Insurance Company and
that she was financially unable to repay the $5,170.51 with
interest to Allstate Insurance Company.

(R. 70) An

order

was

entered dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice (R. 84, 85)
and she filed a Notice of Appeal.

(R. 90)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The lower court made no findings that there was an accord
and satisfaction between plaintiff and defendants. The $5,170.51
with interest ordered to be repaid by Plaintiff represents only
5

approximately one-half of what she is entitled to on a settlement
basis from Defendants. There are no equitable principles requiring
plaintiff to repay this money to Defendants1 insurance carrier.
The order of the lower court ordering the repayment of this money
as a condition of prosecuting her tort claim is erroneous.
POINT II
The order requiring the repayment of $5,170.51 without
interest by Plaintiff is an unconstitutional bar on her access to
the court to prosecute her claim.

Repayment of the money is

contrary to the established judicial policy of the State of Utah
permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a
controversy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO REPAY $5,170.51 WITH INTEREST
TO DEFENDANTS' INSURANCE CARRIER, ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, AS
A

CONDITION

OF

BEING

ABLE

TO ASSERT

HER

TORT

CLAIM

AGAINST

DEFENDANTS.
A.

Analysis of lower court orders of April 15, 1991

(R. 39, 40) and August 15, 1991 (R. 78-80).
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Order April 15th, ordered a
separate trial on the issue of accord and satisfaction as between
Plaintiff and Defendants and if Plaintiff was successful, a second
trial on the tort action.

(R. 40)

A rehearing was held resulting in the order drafted by
Judge Daniels of August 15, 1991 (R. 78-80) rescinding paragraphs

6

3 and 4 of the April 15th order and ordering as follows:
The intention of the Court was not to allow a
new trial on the issue of accord and
satisfaction, but allowed the Plaintiff the
option
of
setting
aside
the
purported
settlement, and proceeding with trial on the
merits. A condition of setting the purported
settlement aside, however, is repayment of the
amount of settlement.
If,

as

a

matter

of

law,

there

was

an

accord

and

satisfaction between Plaintiff and Defendants, Defendants1 original
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted.
v. Transamerica

Ins. Co., 699 P.2d

688

(Utah

Blackhurst

1985);

Lawrence

Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382 (Utah 1982).
The lower court did not take this position in either
order.

It first ordered a separate trial on the accord and

satisfaction and then allowed the "purported agreement" to be set
aside on the condition that $5,170.51 be repaid.
It is submitted that Plaintiff's two affidavits, the
failure to obtain Plaintiff's signature on the "Release of All
Claims" and the letter of the Allstate Claims Manager impelled the
court to conclude as a matter of law that there was not an accord
and satisfaction as between the parties; and further, that the
issue and evidence of accord and satisfaction was insufficient to
warrant a trial.
B.

Restitution

of

the

$5,170.51

with

interest

to

Allstate.
The $5,170.51 represented by the draft given to Plaintiff
consisted of $4,500.00 for the injury settlement and the $670.51
for

Plaintifffs

additional

medical
7

expense.

Allstate

had

previously paid the sum of $3,262.39 to Plaintiff's health care
providers which together with the $670.51 paid as part of the
purported

settlement

adds

up

to

total

medical

expenses

of

$3,932.90.
Prior

to

the

purported

accord

and

satisfaction,

Defendants' insurer, Allstate, had Plaintiff examined by Nathaniel
M. Nord, M.D., and on December 18, 1989, Dr. Nord found a causal
connection between Plaintiff's injury and the automobile accident
out of which this action arises involving Defendant's negligence.
(R. 64)
Liability could not under any circumstances be disputed
in good faith.

See the Investigating Officer's Report and the

"Data Code Explanation Sheet."

(R. 68, 69) Plaintiff was lawfully

parked at Hillcrest High School when Defendant John W. Betteridge,
age 16, drove out of a fenced area at the school, made an improper
right hand turn, and crashed his Jeep into Plaintiff's parked
automobile.

The investigating officer indicated no fault on the

part of Plaintiff.
A minimum settlement of Plaintiff's causally connected
injury is three (3) times the medical expense or $11,798.70.

This

proposition is usual, customary, notorious and widely known in the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court by the insurance company
adjusters, the legal community handling personal injury cases and
the judiciary.
Plaintiff should have been given a minimum settlement of
$11,798.70 of which $5,170.51 or $4,500.00 with interest would have
8

been part.
The necessity for restitution under a "purported" accord
and satisfaction is discussed in 1 C.J.S., Accord and Satisfaction,
§ 70, p. 568 as follows:
"However, restitution is not a condition
precedent where plaintiff is in any event
entitled to the amount received by him, the
amount received does not exceed that which is
admitted
or
conceded
to
be
due
plaintiff. .. .plaintiff does not rely on a
rescission of an accord and satisfaction but
claims that there was no accord...."
In the case of Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Under.,

16 Utah 2nd 211, 398 P.2d

685

(1965), Plaintiff

attempted to set aside a settlement and release given for the sum
of $12,609.39.

A Summary Judgment for Defendant was reversed on

appeal and the Utah Supreme Court held as follows at 398 P.2d 685:
"The defendants also raise the objection to
plaintiff's suit that it should have returned
or tendered the $12,609.39 as a condition
precedent
to seeking
rescission of the
settlement. One pertinent observation of this
point is that it has been held, and properly
so, that where a release of a claim has been
obtained by fraud, a return or tender of the
consideration paid therefor is not a necessary
condition precedent to disaffirmance of the
release and enforcement of the claim."
In the annotation at 134 ALR 6, 91, it is stated as
follows:
"Somewhat analogous to the situation presented
by the cases discussed supra, III a 7, is that
presented where in an action for damages for
personal injuries the defendant pleads a
release or compromise agreement executed by
plaintiff and alleged to represent a settlement
of any claim held by plaintiff against
defendant, and the plaintiff alleges that, as
a matter of fact, no settlement of the kind in
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question was ever arranged by the parties.
There are a number of cases involving this
situation in which the view is taken that even
though it appeared that money or property was
turned over to the holder of the claim for
personal injuries, no return or tender back of
such money or property was necessary as a
condition to the enforcement of the original
claim if it further appeared that, as a matter
of fact, no settlement was actually negotiated
by the parties."
In the case of Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building
& Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938), the Utah Supreme
Court held as follows at 75 P.2d 680:
"Let it be assumed that there was an accord and
satisfaction effectuated by reason of the
surrender and cancellation of the certificate,
as defendant contends there was, it would not
be necessary for the plaintiff to restore the
money already received before it could bring
the present action.
'Restitution is not a
condition precedent where plaintiff is in any
event entitled to the amount received by him
or the amount received does not exceed that
which is admitted or conceded to be due
plaintiff.
Moreover, in the case of Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192
P.624 (1920), the Supreme Court also held as follows at 192 P.626:
"Stress laid upon the fact that the court did
not require the plaintiff to leave with the
clerk the $200.00 paid by the defendant to
plaintiff for the so-called release and
settlement of her claim, which money was
tendered to the defendant in open court and by
him refused. In the case of Miller v. Spokane
Int. Ry. Co., 82 Wash. 170, 143 Pac. 981, the
third defense was that the damages had been
settled by the payment, acceptance, and
retention of $138.00. The respondent replied
that he was a foreigner, unable to read or
write English, and that, if he had signed the
release, he did not know what he was signing.
The court held it was not necessary to return
the $138.00 before commencing the action. It,
however, should have been credited upon the
10

judgment. It was not intended as a gift, and
did not operate as a settlement."
Assuming

that

Plaintiff

repays

the

$5,170.51

with

interest to Allstate and a trial is held and a judgment entered or
a settlement reached for a sum in excess of the $5,170.51, Allstate
would

have to repay

to plaintiff

as part of the

judgment or

settlement the same money that she is now ordered to repay to them.
This contingency was also discussed in Reliable Furniture
Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Under, supra, at 398 P.2d 687:
"Even more fundamental on this point is a
reflection upon the fact that the paramount
objective is always to do justice between these
parties. Upon the basis of the record thus far
developed, it appears that the defendant's own
figures show it owes the plaintiff $12,609.39.
In the event of further proceedings the
defendant can be protected by having that
credit against the amount, if any, in excess
thereof that may be awarded upon final
judgment."
Based on the settlement values of Plaintiff's injury case
and the foregoing authorities, it was error for the court below to
order the repayment of $5,170.51 which perhaps should have been
only $4,500.00 as a condition of bringing her case to trial.
C.

Restitution.

The order of the court to repay the $5,170.51 to Allstate
is restitution.

The basis for restitution is that a person who is

unjustly enriched at the expense of another should be required to
make restitution to the said person.

Harlin v. Daines, 567 P.2d

1120 (Utah 1977).
The Utah Supreme Court observed in L&A Drywall v.
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Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980) as follows at 608
P.2d 630:
"Unjust enrichment occurs whenever a person has
and retains money or benefits which in justice
and equity belong to another."
The court below made no findings of any unjust enrichment
of Plaintiff at the expense of Allstate Insurance Company or how
justice and equity required the repayment of this large sum of
money to Defendants1 insurance carrier.
Plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that she was unable
to repay the $5,170.51 with interest which would be $5,983.58 with
interest at 10% per annum to August 1, 1992.
It is submitted that no equitable principles require
Plaintiff to repay this money to Allstate.
POINT II
THE ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO PAY $5,170.51 WITH INTEREST TO
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY TO PROCEED WITH HER TORT CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANTS VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, § 11.
The Utah

Constitution, Article

I, §

11 provides

as

follows:
"All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party."
Assuming the order for repayment was discretionary with
the court below, it is submitted that the following language is

12

applicable from Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976) at 546
P.2d 603:
"Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law
is the principle that reason and justice shall
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled
will of any one person; and that this applies
to all men in every status: to courts and
judges, as well as to autocrats or bureaucrats.
The meaning of the term "discretion" itself
imports that the action should be taken within
reason and good conscience in the interest of
protecting the rights of both parties and
serving the ends of justice.
It has always
been the policy of our law to resolve doubts
in favor of permitting parties to have their
day in court on the merits of a controversy."
(Emphasis added)
It is submitted that the order or repayment by the court
below is an unconstitutional bar to Plaintiff's prosection of her
case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff should not be required to pay any sum of money
to Allstate Insurance Company as a condition of bringing her tort
claim to trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l>v ^

day of August, 1992,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was
mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert G. Gilchrist, Attorney for
Defendants and Appellees, 50 South Main Street, Suite 700, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101.
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ADDENDUM
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Ju-aaJDisf-a

M 2 3 1992

Robert G. Gilchrist (A3715)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ETHEL SAWYERS ASHWORTH,

*

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
if

vs.
JOHN W. BETTERIDGE and
GEORGE G. BETTERIDGE,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*

Civil No. 900906905

*

Judge Scott Daniels

The Court having entered an Order on August 15, 1991,
in which the Court stated that plaintiff Ethel Sawyers Ashworth
would be given thirty (30) days to repay to the defendants7
insurer the sum of $5,170.51 with interest at which time the
plaintiff would be able to proceed with her tort claim, or in the
alternative that if the plaintiff did not repay said amount
within thirty days, that this action would be deemed dismissed
with prejudice; and the plaintiff having not paid said sum, and
having filed a Notice of Appeal on September 16, 1991; that based
upon the foregoing, and it appearing to the Court that the
plaintiff has not complied with the Court's Order to tender the

"HOSj

above-stated sum in the time prescribed by the Court, and the
Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, having been
previously granted, and the plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial
having been denied, that
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with each
party to bear their own costs.
DATED this 2 >

da

¥

of

V )fl^

1991.

BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Scott Daniels
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Plaintiff

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Robert G. Gilchrist
Attorneys for Defendants
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